The Zuozhuan, traditionally attributed to one Zuo Qiuming, is the earliest extant detailed historical narrative in Chinese. It was probably composed in the fourth century BCE but incorporates earlier written sources and oral traditions. Written in the state of Lu, it records the internal politics, diplomatic relations, and military conflicts of the various Zhou states from 722 BCE to 468 BCE, and is known for its colorful anecdotes and vivid dialogue. It also contains commentarial remarks attributed to Confucius or to an anonymous “noble man” (junzi), who may be the author himself. Some other “direct” commentarial passages by the author supply interpretations of lines found in the Annals (Chunqiu, “Spring and Autumn”), a much more laconic chronicle of the period 722-481 BCE that was traditionally attributed to Confucius’s authorship. In the third century CE, Du Yu (222-285), a self-professed “Zuozhuan addict,” merged the texts of the Annals and the Zuozhuan to turn the latter into a full commentary on the former, supplying historical context and narrative detail missing in the bare-bones Annals narrative. Du then added further commentary to explain and interpret the Zuozhuan.

Alone among pre-imperial texts, the Zuozhuan refers to the Zhou elites using two different ethnonyms, Hua 華 and Xia 夏 (other texts only call them the Xia). The origin and etymology of these terms are unclear: Hua means “flower” or “flowery,” while Xia means “summer” (or, in some ancient texts, “large” or “multicolored”) and was purportedly also the name of an ancient dynasty founded by the son of the sage-king Yu, though its historicity remains unconfirmed.¹ Hua and Hua-Xia became standard ethnonyms for the Chinese (and names for their homeland) by the end of the Han empire, but their prevalence in the pre-imperial period also remains unclear, as they appear only in the Zuozhuan, and even that text uses the compound Hua-Xia only once.²

These caveats notwithstanding, anecdotes in the Zuozhuan do reflect the concept of a community of “Hua states” (zhu Hua 諸華) or “Xia states” (zhu Xia 諸夏) in north China—also called the “Central States” (Zhongguo 中國)—that would, ideally, aid one another and the Zhou king against attacks by other peoples labeled as Rong 戎 and Di 狄. The Rong were mostly located in modern Shaanxi, Ningxia, and eastern Gansu to the west of the Central States, though some Rong groups migrated into the Eastern Zhou heartland in Henan.³ The Di originated from Shanxi and Hebei to the north but frequently raided Hua-Xia states to their south. In addition, peoples known as Man 蠻 lived in the middle and lower Yangzi regions, and peoples known as Yi 夷 inhabited eastern areas of Shandong and Jiangsu, including the coasts and the lower Huai River valley. The Rong, Di, Man, and Yi peoples could also be referenced collectively or generically using synecdochic expressions like Yi-Di, Man-Yi, and Rong-Di or “the Yi of the four quarters” (siyi 四夷). These generic terms are best translated, in my view, as “the barbarians” because of the associations with inferiority that they later acquired as labels for foreign peoples beyond the frontiers of the Chinese empires, similar to the use of the Greek-derived label “barbarus” under the Roman empire.

Passages in the Zuozhuan imply that the Hua-Xia sense of ethnic community was based partly on commonalities in language, cuisine, style of clothing and coiffure, and ritual norms—all aspects of what modern anthropologists call “culture.” But it was also understood in terms of bonds of kinship between the ruling houses of the Hua-Xia states: many were related to the Ji 姬 royal clan of Zhou, and all had intermarried for generations. The most well-known example of this kinship principle occurs in the context of an attack on the minor states of Xing and Wei by a group of Di in 661–659 BCE. Wei’s capital quickly falls and its ruler is killed, but Guan Zhong, the chancellor of Qi, convinces his lord to send an army to Xing’s rescue by arguing that the Xia states are “close kin.” A coalition of states led by Qi then drives out the Di and builds new, more secure capitals for both Xing and Wei.

The Zuozhuan record shows, however, that such rhetorical appeals to kinship and shared ethnicity only rarely sufficed to prevent conflict between Hua-Xia states. Nor did they prevent Hua-Xia states from allying with barbarian polities for strategic advantage, sometimes even forming marriage alliances with them. Even Zhou royalty were not above using “barbarian” allies for their political purposes, as seen in the case of both King Xiang (r. 651-619 BCE) and his ambitious half-brother Prince Dai.

In the Zuozhuan narrative, peoples like the Rong and Yi are depicted as culturally and genealogically “other” but not inherently inferior to the Hua-Xia, although some negative stereotyping is visible. The boundaries of Hua-Xia identity were somewhat fluid: Certain Rong and Yi groups claimed to be descended from ancient (and probably mythical) rulers or ministers whom the Zhou elite recognized as contributors to the history of Chinese civilization. One southern “barbarian” state, Wu, even claimed—probably for the sake of prestige in relations with the Hua-Xia states—that its king was a distant Ji-clan relative of the Zhou king, descended from a virtuous Zhou prince who had moved south to cede the right of succession to his younger brother. Meanwhile, it was possible for a previously Hua-Xia state, Qǐ, to be culturally “barbarized” by contact with the Yi—at least in the eyes of its overlord, the state of Lu. The most powerful southern state, Chu, held a similarly ambiguous status as a former Zhou colony whose rulers began styling themselves as kings around 704 BCE.⁴ Zuozhuan entries pertaining to 560 BCE (Lord Xiang, Year 13) and 547 BCE (Lord Xiang, Year 26) indicate that the Chu elite saw themselves as a kind of intermediary between the “Xia states” and the “Man and Yi” peoples of the south, but also as distinct from both the “Hua-Xia” of the north and the “eastern Yi” of the lower Huai valley.⁵

The translations below are adapted from the complete translation of the Zuozhuan by Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg, Zuo Tradition/Zuozhuan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016). The translations from Du Yu’s commentary are my own.

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Lord Min, Year 1 (661 BCE)

The Di attacked [the state of] Xing. Guan Zhong said to the Lord of Qi, “The Rong and Di are as insatiable as jackals and wolves. The Xia states are our close kin, and we cannot abandon them. Complacency is a poison that must not be embraced. As the ode says, ‘How could we not long to go home? But we fear [disobeying] these words written on bamboo.’⁶ The words written on bamboo speak of aiding one another against our common enemies. I request that we rescue Xing to abide by these words written on bamboo.” The men of Qi then went to the rescue of Xing. 

…

Lord Min, Year 2 (660 BCE)

In winter, in the twelfth month, the Di people attacked [the state of] Wei. Lord Yi of Wei was fond of cranes and allowed his pet cranes to ride in his carriage. Just before the battle, the men of the [Wei] capital who had been issued armor [to fight] said, “Send the cranes instead! It’s the cranes who get the salaries and titles, so how can we be the ones to go to battle?” … They fought with the Di at Xingze (Xing Marsh) and the Wei army was defeated.⁷ [The state of] Wei then fell…. The Di entered [the capital of] Wei and then pursued [the fleeing refugees], defeating them again at the Yellow River…. [The refugees] established Lord Dai as ruler, and he lodged in [the state of] Cao…. The Lord of Qi sent [his son] Prince Wukui with three hundred chariots and three thousand armored troops to garrison Cao [and deter the Di]….

In the first year of Lord Xi (659 BCE), Lord Huan of Qi relocated the capital of Xing to Yiyi. In the second year (658 BCE), he granted Wei a new capital at Chuqiu. Xing celebrated its relocation like a return home, and Wei forgot about its previous fall.

…

Lord Xi, Year 11 (649 BCE)

In summer, the Rong of Yang, Ju, Quan, Gao, and the Yi and Luo rivers⁸ joined forces and attacked the Zhou capital. They entered the king’s palace and set fire to the eastern gate. It was Prince Dai who summoned them.⁹ [The states of] Qin and Jin attacked the Rong, coming to the king’s rescue. In autumn, the Lord of Jin brokered a peace treaty with the Rong on behalf of the king.

…

Lord Xi, Year 12 (648 BCE)

On account of the Rong attack, the king launched a punitive expedition against Prince Dai. In the autumn, Prince Dai fled to Qi.¹⁰ In winter, the Lord of Qi sent Guan Zhong to broker peace between the Rong and the king, and sent Xi Peng to broker peace between the Rong and [the state of] Jin.

…

Lord Xi, Year 13 (647 BCE)

In summer, there was a conference of the lords at Xian. This was because the Yi of the Huai River were troubling [the state of] Qǐ¹¹, and also to coordinate plans for [defending and stabilizing] the royal house. In autumn, on account of the [continued] Rong threat, the lords sent troops to garrison the Zhou capital.

…

Lord Xi, Year 20 (640 BCE)

In autumn, Qi made a covenant with the Di at [the state of] Xing. This was to coordinate plans for Xing’s defense against the threat of Wei. Wei at this time was troubling Xing.¹²

…

Lord Xi, Year 22 (638 BCE)

Earlier [around 738 BCE], when King Ping moved the capital east [to Luoyi], Xin You went to the Yi River.¹³ Upon seeing someone wearing his hair loose [like the Rong] while offering a sacrifice in the countryside, he said, “Within a hundred years, this probably will be a land of the Rong! It has already lost its ritual propriety!”

In the autumn [of 638 BCE], Qin and Jin resettled the Rong of Luhun along the Yi River.¹⁴

… [The minister] Fu Chen said to the king (King Xiang), “Please call back Prince Dai [from exile]. As the ode says, ‘He is in accord with his neighbors, and in harmony with kith and kin.’¹⁵ If brothers [in the royal house] cannot be in accord, then how can we blame the lords for being in conflict?” The king was pleased to hear this. Prince Dai returned to the royal capital from Qi at the king’s invitation.¹⁶

…

Lord Xi, Year 23 (637 BCE)

In the eleventh month, Lord Cheng of Qǐ died. The text [of the Annals] calls him “Master” (zi 子) because Qǐ was a Yi domain.¹⁷ It does not record his name because he had not made a covenant with us. In all cases when a lord has joined us in a covenant, on the occasion of his death it is in accordance with ritual propriety to send us notice of his death using his name. If notice is sent with his name, then we record it. Otherwise we do not, in order to avoid misstating it out of carelessness.

[Commentary by Du Yu (222-285): “Lord Cheng began practicing the ritual of the Yi and continued doing so for the rest of his life. He was therefore demoted upon his death. The lords of Qǐ were actually addressed as ‘Liege’ (bo 伯), but Confucius used his writing to demote them to ‘Master’ (zi). That is why the Zuozhuan says ‘the text [of the Annals] calls him “Master” so as to clarify things.”]

…

Lord Xi, Year 24 (636 BCE)

When [the state of] Zheng invaded [the state of] Hua, the Hua people submitted to its commands. But when the Zheng army withdrew, then [Hua] again aligned with Wei.¹⁸ Prince Shi and Xuedu Yumi of Zheng led an army to again attack Hua. The king sent Bofu and Yousun Bo to Zheng to ask for leniency for Hua. The Liege of Zheng… resented the king for ceding Hua to Wei. He therefore disobeyed the king’s command and detained the two envoys. The king was angry and was going to use the Di to attack Zheng.¹⁹ Fu Chen remonstrated, saying, “You cannot do this… Formerly, the Duke of Zhou grieved that his two younger brothers had fallen out with him.²⁰ Hence he granted domains to kinsmen and relatives to serve as a protective hedge or screen for the Zhou royal house…. Now you, the Son of Heaven, cannot bear a petty grievance and on this account reject your Zheng kinsmen.²¹ How is this in keeping with [past precedent]? .The greatest acts of moral virtue are to reward merit, draw close to kinsmen, trust close advisers, and honor the worthy…. Among the various Ji-clan domains, [Zheng] is the closest [to us], and they possess all four of the great virtues. Ears that cannot hear the harmony of musical tones are deaf; eyes that cannot distinguish the colors are blind; hearts that do not take moral virtue and duty as their model are wayward; mouths that do not speak loyal and trustworthy words are perfidious. The Di exemplify all these and possess all four forms of iniquity (i.e., deadness, blindness, waywardness, and perfidy)! … The people have not forgotten the former calamity²², and yet you, O King, wish to provoke it again. How is this in keeping with [the ways of] kings Wen and Wu?²³” The king did not heed this but sent Tuishu and Taozi to mobilize the Di army.

In summer, the Di attacked Zheng and took [the city of] Li. The king was grateful to the Di leader and was going to take his daughter as queen. Fu Chen remonstrated, saying, “You cannot do this. I have heard this saying, ‘When the one repaying is exhausted, the one who gave the gift is still expecting more.’ The Di are already greedy, and you, O King, are whetting their appetite. ‘A woman’s desires know no limit; a wife’s resentment knows no end.’ The Di will surely become a danger to us.” The king again did not listen….

Earlier, … Prince Dai had fled to Qi, but the king had brought him back. He then had an affair with Lady Wei (the new Di queen). The king decided to replace Lady Wei.²⁴ Tuishu and Taozi said to one another, “We were the ones sent as envoys to [mobilize the] Di; now the Di will surely resent us.” So they supported Prince Dai and mobilized the Di to attack the king. The king’s royal guard was going to resist the attack, but the king said, “What would the former queen say of me?²⁵ I would rather the lords intervene.” He left the capital and went to Kankan, but the people of the capital brought him back.

That autumn, Tuishu and Taozi, supporting Prince Dai, mobilized a Di army to attack the Zhou capital. They routed the Zhou army and captured the Duke of Zhou, Jifu, the lieges of Yuan and Bo, and Fu Chen. The king fled the capital and took refuge in Zheng. Prince Dai took Lady Wei and went to reside at Wen.

[Translator’s note: That winter, King Xiang sends envoys to his “uncles” the lords of Lu, Jin, and Qin and requests their aid against Prince Dai. In 635 BCE, a Jin army besieges Wen, captures and executes Prince Dai, and escorts King Xiang back into the royal capital.]

…

Lord Xi, Year 27 (633 BCE)

In the spring of the twenty-seventh year, Lord Huan of Qǐ came to visit our court. He used the ritual of the Yi, and that is why he is called “Master.”²⁶

[Commentary by Du Yu: “The lords of Qĭ were descendants of the kings of a past dynasty (the Xia). But because they lived in close proximity to the Eastern Yi, their customs had been adulterated and corrupted. Their language and style of clothing sometimes followed the Yi. That is why when the ‘Master’ of Qĭ died, the Zuozhuan called him a Yi.”]

Our lord belittled Qǐ because Qǐ did not show respect. [Commentary by Du Yu: “Qĭ used the ritual of the Yi, so they were disparaged as inferior.”] …

In the autumn, we invaded Qǐ to chastise them for not behaving in accordance with ritual propriety.²⁷

…

Lord Cheng, Year 4 (587 BCE)

In the autumn, our lord (Lord Cheng) returned from Jin. He wished to seek an accord with Chu and to turn against Jin. [The chief minister] Ji Wenzi said, “This will not do. Although Jin is unjust, we cannot yet turn against it. Its domain is large, and its ministers are harmonious. It is close to us and the other lords defer to it. We cannot yet switch allegiance. As it says in Scribe Yi’s Records²⁸, “They are not our kin (zulei 族類), so their hearts and minds must be different.” Although Chu is a strong state, its people are not of our lineage (zu 族).²⁹ Would it be willing to protect us?” Our lord thus desisted.

…

Lord Xiang, Year 13 (560 BCE)

When the Master (zi) of Chu³⁰ (King Gong of Chu) was [terminally] ill, he addressed his ministers: “I, despite lacking virtue, have presided over this domain since my early years. When I was ten, I lost my father, the former king. Before I could master the instructions of my teachers and guardians, I inherited the greatly blessed position [of kingship]. That was how, lacking virtue, I lost an army at Yan (the Battle of Yanling), brought disgrace to the domain, and brought grief and worry to my ministers. My failings are many. If, thanks to my ministers’ abilities, I manage to die a natural death with my head still upon my shoulders, then for the purposes of the spring and autumn sacrifices at my tomb after I follow the former king my father into his ancestral temple, I request to be given the posthumous honorific ‘Ling’ (Disordered) or ‘Li’ (Murderous).³¹ You, my ministers, shall choose between them.” None replied. After he gave the command five times, they assented.

In autumn, King Gong of Chu died. Zinang³² held a discussion about the posthumous honorific. The ministers said, “The ruler has already given his command.” Zinang said, “We should hold the ruler’s command in reverence (gong 共), but how can we destroy [his posthumous reputation]? He oversaw the great and glorious state of Chu, gaining sway over the Man and Yi and campaigning as far the Southern Sea, bringing them to submit to the Xia states (zhu Xia).³³ And yet he recognized his errors. Can he not be called ‘reverent’? I request to honor him posthumously as ‘Gong.’” The ministers followed his suggestion.

…

Lord Xiang, Year 14 (559 BCE)

The lords held a conference at Xiang to discuss attacking Chu in support of Wu.³⁴ … Jin was about to arrest Juzhi, a Master (zi) of the Rong.³⁵ [The Jin minister] Fan Gai (Xuanzi) personally reprimanded him at court, saying, “Come here, you Master of the Jiang Rong lineage! Formerly, the men of Qin pressed your ancestor Wuli hard and drove him from Guazhou.³⁶ Your ancestor Wuli, draped in a white rush cape and wearing a headdress made from brambles, came to our former ruler for protection. Though our former ruler, Lord Hui, had meager lands, he divided them with you to provide you with sustenance. Now the reason that the lords no longer serve our unworthy ruler in the same way as before is because word of our negotiations leaked out, and this could have happened only on account of you. You are not to take part in tomorrow morning’s event. If you do, we will have you arrested.”

[Juzhi] replied, “Formerly, the men of Qin, relying on their numbers and covetous of territory, expelled us, the Rong. Lord Hui, making manifest his great virtue, said that we, the Rong, were the descendants of the Four Mounts,³⁷ and that we were not to be cut off and abandoned. He bestowed on us the lands of Jin’s southern marches, where foxes and wild cats made their lairs, and where jackals and wolves howled. We, the Rong, removed and cut down their brambles and drove away their foxes and wild cats, jackals and wolves, and became subjects of the former lord. Neither aggressive nor rebellious, we have been unwavering in our allegiance ever since.

Formerly, Lord Wen of Jin, together with Qin, attacked Zheng. Qin secretly swore a covenant with Zheng and set up garrisons there.³⁸ That was why armies were mobilized at Yao. Jin resisted Qin from above, and the Rong withstood it from below.³⁹ That the Qin army did not come back is due to none other than us, the Rong. Just as in the pursuit of a deer, the men of Jin seized its antlers, and the Rong caught its legs and with Jin brought it to the ground. How have the Rong failed to acquit themselves of your charge of betrayal? From that time until the present, in the hundred campaigns of Jin, we, the Rong, have always taken part. Following those in charge of Jin government, our intent has ever been the same as at [the battle of] Yao. How would we dare to distance ourselves from you or go against you?

Now is it not your officials of various ranks who themselves are remiss, and who have in this way alienated the lords, while you lay the blame on us, the Rong? Our diet and clothing are all different from those of the Hua. We do not exchange gifts with you, and the difference between our language and yours does not allow for communication. How can we possibly harm you?⁴⁰ We will feel no grief from being excluded from the conference.”

He chanted [the ode] “Qingying” (Blue Fly) and withdrew.⁴¹

Fan Gai acknowledged his error and allowed Juzhi to take part in affairs at the conference, thus manifesting the attributes [mentioned in the ode] of being “joyous and civil.”

…

Lord Xiang, Year 29 (544 BCE)

The Lord of Jin (Lord Ping) sent the supervisor of the military, Ru Qi, to Lu to manage the return of Qǐ territories [captured by Lu], but Lu did not return all of them.⁴² The widow of Lord Dao of Jin (r. 572-558 BCE), who was Lord Ping’s mother, said heatedly, “Ru Qi must have taken bribes [from Lu]. If the former lord had known of this, he would have had Ru Qi arrested and done away with.” The lord told Ru Qi about his mother’s words. Ru Qi said, “Yu, Guo, Jiao, Hua, Huo, Yang, Han, and Wei were all states ruled by lineages with the clan name Ji.⁴³ Jin became great by annexing them. How else can land be taken, if not by invading small states? There have been so many cases, from Lord Wu (r. 679-677 BCE) and Lord Xian (r. 676-651 BCE) on, of Jin taking over other states that no one can keep track of them! Qǐ, a remnant of the Xia dynasty, has gone over to the eastern Yi.⁴⁴ Lu is descended from the Duke of Zhou and has harmonious relations with Jin. Even if Lu were to be given full power over Qǐ, that would still be acceptable. Why be concerned about this? … Why must we impoverish Lu to enrich Qǐ?…”⁴⁵

Lord Wen of Qǐ came [to Lu] to swear a covenant with us. [Du Yu’s commentary: Lu returned his territories, so he came to swear a covenant.] The text [of the Annals] calls him a “Master” to disparage him as inferior. [Du Yu’s commentary: He was disparaged for using the ritual of the Yi.”]⁴⁶

…

Lord Zhao, Year 17 (525 BCE)

In autumn, the Master (zi) of Tan came to visit our court.⁴⁷ The lord (Lord Zhao) held a feast for him. Master Zhao (Shusun Chuo) asked him, “The lineage of Shaohao named its offices after birds.⁴⁸ Why is that?” The Master of Tan said, “Shaohao was my ancestor, so I know the answer. Long ago, the lineage of Huangdi (the Yellow Lord) took clouds as its auspicious symbol and therefore established cloud masters, whose titles were named after clouds. The lineage of Yandi (the Fiery Lord) took fire as its auspicious symbol and therefore established fire masters whose titles were named after fires. The lineage of Gonggong took water as its auspicious symbol and therefore established water masters whose titles were named after water. The lineage of Taihao had the dragon as its auspicious symbol and therefore established dragon masters whose titles were named after dragons.⁴⁹ Just at the moment when my distant ancestor Shaohao, named Zhi, was established as ruler, a phoenix appeared, so he took birds as his auspicious symbol and established bird masters whose titles were named after birds⁵⁰ …. Since the time of Zhuanxu, no one has been able to use long-ago events as auspicious symbols, so they have used recent events instead.⁵¹ Being unable to follow the earlier practice, they have established masters of the people and named their titles after the people’s affairs.”

Hearing of this, Confucius (Kongzi) met with the Master of Tan and learned these things from him.⁵² Afterward, he told others, “I have heard this saying: ‘When the Son of Heaven has lost [the history of] official positions, it can still be learned among the barbarians (Yi) of the four quarters.’ That remains true today.”⁵³

…

Lord Ding, Year 10 (500 BCE)

In the summer, our lord met with the Lord of Qi at Zhuqi, also known as Jiagu.⁵⁴ As Confucius was assisting [our lord], Wang Meng said to the Lord of Qi, “Confucius understands ritual but lacks valor. If we have men from Lai threaten the Lord of Lu with their weapons, we are certain to achieve our aims.”⁵⁵ The Lord of Qi agreed with this plan.

Retreating [from the men of Lai] with our lord, Confucius said, “Men, use your weapons! The two rulers are making peace, yet foreign Yi captives are using their weapons to disrupt it. This is not how the Lord of Qi should command the other lords. Foreigners should not plot against the Xia, the Yi should not bring disorder to the Hua, captives should not interfere with peace covenants, and weapons should not be used to coerce one’s friends. These things are inauspicious with regard to the spirits, they are failures by the standards of moral authority, and they are ritually improper in terms of human relations. Surely a lord would not act like this.” When the Lord of Qi heard this, he immediately sent the Lai men away.⁵⁶

…

Lord Ai, Year 13 (482 BCE)

In the summer, our lord had a conference with Lord Ping of Shan, Lord Ding of Jin, and [King] Fuchai of Wu at Huangchi…. In the sixth month, on the bingzi day, the Master (zi) of Yue⁵⁷ attacked Wu via two routes…. On the dinghai day, [the Yue army] entered the Wu capital. The people of Wu reported the defeat to the Wu king. The king, horrified that the news of his defeat would be heard [by the other lords], personally slit seven men’s throats in his tent [to keep them from leaking this information].⁵⁸

In autumn, in the seventh month, on the xinchou day, they made a covenant. Wu and Jin contended for precedence.⁵⁹ The men of Wu said, “Among the Zhou nobility, we are the senior branch.”⁶⁰ The men of Jin said, “Among those with the Ji clan name, we are the hegemonic state.”

[The Jin minister] Zhao Yang called to his supervisor of the military, Yin, and said, “The day is growing late and we have not yet completed this important business; that is our fault, yours and mine. Set up the flags. Put the battle lines in order. We two will die for it, and then it will certainly be possible to see who is senior and who is junior.”⁶¹ Yin replied, “Let me have a look at [the Wu forces].” He returned and said, “Rulers who eat a meat diet should not have dark, ink-like faces.⁶² Now the King of Wu does have a dark, ink-like face. Has his domain been defeated? Has his heir died? Besides, barbarians (Yi) have an impulsive temperament.⁶³ They cannot bear to wait long. Let us wait for a short time.” In the end, the men of Jin were indeed given precedence.

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1. A seventh-century CE commentary on the Zuozhuan glosses these names as follows: “The Central States (Zhongguo) had the greatness of ritual protocol, hence they were called Xia; they had the beauty of ritual clothing, hence they were called Hua.” This interpretation is cited by many modern studies, but it lacks a basis in early Chinese texts. ↩︎
2. A chapter of the Documents (see source 2.2), titled “Wucheng” (The Completion of Military Victory), contains the phrase “Hua-Xia and Man-Mo” 華夏蠻貊 (i.e., Chinese and barbarians), and purports to record a speech made by King Wu of Zhou after his conquest of the Shang dynasty in ca. 1046 BCE. However, the received text is now believed to be a forgery by the fourth-century CE scholar Mei Ze and his associates. ↩︎
3. A people known to the Hua-Xia as “Mountain Rong” also inhabited the Yan Mountains of northern Hebei, on the northern borders of the state of Yan. ↩︎
4. On this subject, see Yuri Pines, “Chu Identity as Seen from Its Manuscripts: A Reevaluation,” Journal of Chinese History 2 (2018), 1-26. ↩︎
5. It should be noted that the entry for 547 BCE is the only instance when the compound Hua-Xia appears in the Zuozhuan or in any other authentic pre-imperial text. In all other cases, Hua and Xia are used interchangeably, but not in combination. ↩︎
6. This quotes the ode “Chuche” (Driving the Chariots Out), in which the speaker is summoned by the Zhou king, via orders written on bamboo slips, to serve on a military expedition against the Xianyun on the northern frontier. ↩︎
7. Lord Yi of Wei was killed in this battle, after refusing to conceal his identity by removing his banner from his chariot. ↩︎
8. These were all Rong groups that had settled in the area around the Eastern Zhou capital (Luoyang). ↩︎
9. Prince Dai was a younger half-brother of King Xiang with ambitions to seize the throne. ↩︎
10. Prince Dai remained in exile in Qi for ten years to evade the wrath of King Xiang. ↩︎
11. This hints at the Yi influence that will later be reflected in entries pertaining to the state of Qǐ. The name of this small state in Shandong was written as 杞 and is not to be confused with the larger and stronger state of Qi 齊. I have used a tone mark to differentiate the two. ↩︎
12. In 642 BCE, Xing had allied with the Di to attack Wei. Wei then attacked Xing in retaliation in 641 BCE. Clearly, a shared history of being invaded and nearly destroyed by the Di twenty years before had not made for lasting solidarity between Xing and Wei (which, moreover, were both Ji-clan states). The Annals records that in the following year (639 BCE), the Di invaded Wei, clearly with the encouragement of Qi. In 635 BCE, Wei in turn invaded and conquered Xing. ↩︎
13. After a Rong (Quanrong) invasion overran the Zhou capital in 771 BCE, the reconstituted Zhou court under King Ping established its new capital in Chengzhou, also known as Luoyi (near modern Luoyang). The move to Luoyi was traditionally dated to 770 BCE, but the recently discovered bamboo manuscript Xinian suggests that it actually took place in 738 BCE, after a period of instability and division in the Zhou realm. The Yi River, a tributary of the Luo River, ran near Luoyi. ↩︎
14. The Zuozhuan means to assert that this resettlement fulfilled Xin You’s prophecy. The Rong of Luhun originally lived in Qin territory. After their resettlement, they became allies of Jin in its conflict with Chu but eventually developed closer relations with Chu. In 525 BCE, Jin conquered the Rong of Luhun in a surprise attack. ↩︎
15. This quotes the ode “Zhengyue” (The First Month). ↩︎
16. Prince Dai’s return to the Zhou capital sowed the seeds for another crisis in 636 BCE, namely a Di attack on the capital. ↩︎
17. The lords of Qĭ are said to have claimed descent from the kings of the ancient (possibly mythical) Xia 夏 dynasty and officially held the title of “Liege” (bo), but the Annals records Lord Cheng’s death with the phrase, “The Master (zi) of Qĭ died.” “Master” was a lower-ranking noble title than “Liege.” ↩︎
18. Hua 滑 (not to be confused with the ethnonym Hua 華) was a small Ji-clan state that had previously been a vassal of Zheng, but had realigned itself with Wei, leading to a Zheng invasion in 640 BCE. ↩︎
19. By this time, the Zhou royal army was too small to take on the Zheng army, hence the king’s need to use the Di as allies. ↩︎
20. A reference to the Rebellion of Lords Guan and Cai against the Duke of Zhou’s regency, also known as the Rebellion of the Three Overseers. ↩︎
21. The Zheng lords were of the same Ji clan as the Zhou kings. ↩︎
22. That is, the Rong attack on the Zhou capital in 649 BCE. ↩︎
23. Kings Wen and Wu were the founders of the Zhou dynasty. ↩︎
24. Presumably, she had lost the king’s favor over the scandalous affair with Prince Dai. ↩︎
25. That is, it would be improper for him to take up arms against his former queen’s family. ↩︎
26. Du Yu’s commentary surmises that because Qĭ lay in close proximity to the Yi peoples, it had been corrupted by Yi customs and rites. ↩︎
27. Du Yu suggested that Qǐ stopped using Yi ritual after suffering this punitive attack by Lu, as seen from a reference to Lord Huan of Qǐ by his proper title of “Liege” (bo) in the record for 615 BCE. ↩︎
28. This text was attributed to Yin Yi, a scribe who lived at the beginning of the Zhou dynasty. Only a few fragments, including this one, have survived. ↩︎
29. Jin Wenzi understands zu and zulei in terms of ancestral lineage, not ethnicity. The Lu and Jin ruling houses were both descended from the Zhou royal clan of Ji, whereas Chu’s ruling house was not, but the Zuozhuan (unlike the Odes [see source 1.1] and the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries [see source 1.5]) generally does not interpret Chu as a “barbarian” state. However, in imperial times zulei acquired an ethnic meaning that gradually superseded the kinship-based meaning, and the saying quoted here was frequently used to argue that barbarians could not be trusted because they had no shared ancestry with the Chinese. ↩︎
30. The Annals typically refers to Chu rulers by the noble rank of Master (zi), even though they actually used the title “king,” because the Zhou court did not recognize their kingly titles as legitimate. However, later in this account, the ruler of Chu is named as King Gong of Chu, reflecting his actual posthumous title. ↩︎
31. That is, to be known posthumously as either King Ling or King Li. ↩︎
32. Zinang (d. 559) was a brother of King Gong who served as chief minister of Chu. ↩︎
33. This sentence places Chu in an ambiguous position between the Man and Yi and the Xia states. This ambiguity seems unique to the Zuozhuan, as the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries to the Annals (see source 1.5) unequivocally denigrate Chu as a barbarian (Yi-Di) state. The Guliang subcommentator Fan Ning argued that the Central States regarded Chu as a barbarian state because it had adopted the customs of the Man. ↩︎
34. Wu had just been defeated by Chu in a battle and was seeking assistance from its ally, Jin. ↩︎
35. This leader of the Rong bore the noble title of Master, but it is unclear whether this was formally conferred by the Zhou king. ↩︎
36. Du Yu and other later commentators identified Guazhou as Dunhuang in Gansu. Modern historians, starting from Gu Jiegang, place it instead in the Qin Mountains south of the Wei River valley. Du Yu also interpreted Guazhou as the homeland of the Rong of Luhun (see the entry from Lord Xi, Year 22 above), but evidence for this is lacking. ↩︎
37. In early Chinese mythology, the Four Mounts were a group of ministers (or, according to some interpretations, a single man) who helped Yu to quell the great flood. They were later given the clan name Jiang 姜. The Rong people in this anecdote used the clan name Jiang and apparently claimed descent from the Four Mounts. The Zuozhuan also occasionally refers to the Four Mounts as the Great Mounts. ↩︎
38. In 630 BCE, Qin betrayed its ally Jin by pretending to cooperate with a Jin attack on Zheng but secretly sending military forces to help Zheng defend itself. ↩︎
39. In 627 BCE, Qin attempted to annex Zheng in a surprise attack, but the Qin army aborted its mission after being tricked into believing that Zheng had found out about its plans. Jin and its Jiang Rong allies then inflicted a major defeat on the retreating Qin army at Yao (also pronounced as Xiao). See also the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries’ interpretations of this battle in source 1.5. ↩︎
40. This argument indirectly reflects the set of cultural features that the Hua elites saw themselves as sharing in common. ↩︎
41. This ode likens slanderers to flies buzzing around the ruler and admonishes him not to believe them, appealing to his “joyous and civil” character. It was customary for lords and nobles of the Hua-Xia states to chant or sing odes to one another at social occasions, using the lyrics to convey messages politely. Juzhi’s pointed chanting of “Qingying” is ironic because it displays his mastery of Hua-Xia elite culture and thus contradicts his (perhaps sardonic) claim that his people have nothing in common with the Hua-Xia.  ↩︎
42. At this time Lord Ping of Jin (r. 557-532 BCE), whose mother was from the ruling house of Qĭ, was seeking to defend Qĭ from encroachment and domination by Lu. ↩︎
43. That is, relatives of both the Jin ruling house and the Zhou royal house. Wei 魏 was a different state from the Wei 衛 mentioned in earlier excerpts. Hua 滑 was actually conquered by Qin in 627 BCE, as a “consolation prize” after it aborted its invasion on Zheng, but the decisive defeat of the Qin expedition by Jin at Yao allowed Jin to annex the territory of Hua instead. ↩︎
44. That is, it has become acculturated to Yi ways. ↩︎
45. Ru Qi is criticizing Lord Ping for letting his mother dictate Jin foreign policy in a manner detrimental to solidarity among states bearing the Ji clan name. Ru Qi finds it hypocritical for Jin to oppose Lu’s annexation of a non-Ji state (and a “barbarized” one at that) when Jin itself has annexed numerous states ruled by its Ji kin. Note that the pro-Lu bias in this anecdote is very evident; the Zuozhuan was composed in Lu using Lu court sources. ↩︎
46. Du Yu speculates that Qǐ had again begun using “the ritual of the Yi” under Lord Wen. ↩︎
47. Tan, like Qǐ, was a minor vassal state of Lu in Shandong. The people of Lu apparently regarded the people of Tan as Yi “barbarians.” ↩︎
48. Shaohao was a legendary ancient ruler whom later lore identified as a son of Huangdi (the Yellow Lord). The rulers of Tan claimed descent from him. Shusun Chuo (d. 517 BCE), also known posthumously as Master Zhao, was a Lu minister from the aristocratic Shusun lineage. ↩︎
49. Huangdi, Yandi, Gonggong, and Taihao were legendary ancient rulers. In later lore, Gonggong was identified as a descendant of Yandi and as a water deity. Taihao was conflated with the sage-king Fuxi, Yandi was conflated with the sage-king Shennong, and Huangdi and Yandi were interpreted as rival sage-kings and progenitors of various noble or ruling lineages. ↩︎
50. The Master of Tan goes on to give a detailed description of the various types of bird masters and their roles. This is omitted from the translation. ↩︎
51. Zhuanxu was another legendary sage-ruler, later identified as Huangdi’s grandson and successor and a rival of Gonggong. ↩︎
52. On Confucius, see also source 1.3. ↩︎
53. This quote means that barbarian peoples have preserved knowledge of ancient official ranks and titles that have long become obsolete among the Chinese. While some have read it as an open-minded acknowledgment that the Chinese can learn something from barbarians, it is important to note that Confucius sees them only as a kind of repository of ancient lore, rather than as moral and cultural equals. ↩︎
54. The two states had recently been at war and were negotiating a peace agreement. ↩︎
55. Lai was a Yi state that Qi had conquered in 567 BCE. Presumably, Wang Meng proposed using Lai men to take the Lord of Lu hostage, rather than regular Qi soldiers, so that the Lord of Qi could disclaim responsibility. ↩︎
56. The Guliang and Gongyang commentaries to the Annals (see source 1.5) give significantly different versions of this story. In the Guliang commentary, “men of Qi” charge in to the sound of drums and attempt to seize the Lord of Lu, but retreat when Confucius asks, “The two lords are making peace, so what are these barbarian (Yi-Di) people doing here?” Chastened, the Lord of Qi apologizes and later berates his advisors for “leading me into the customs of the barbarians (Yi-Di)” while Confucius is advising his lord with “the way of the ancients.” The subcommentator Fan Ning rationalizes this account by arguing that Confucius called the men of Qi barbarians because they were behaving barbarically, without ritual propriety. In the Gongyang commentary, the Lord of Qi commands a troupe of dwarf (zhuru) musicians to perform in front of the Lord of Lu and take him hostage, but Confucius foils the plot by ordering that the dwarfs be beheaded for beguiling the lords of Qi and Lu. The Shiji (see source 1.8) biography of Confucius synthesizes the Zuozhuan, Guliang, and Gongyang narratives by having Confucius interrupt two successive performances presented by the Lord of Qi: one with armed dancers performing the “music of the barbarians,” and one with dwarf musicians. It is likely, however, that the three versions reflect different narrative traditions about Confucius’s life passed down by competing schools of “Confucian” learning in the Warring States period. ↩︎
57. This was King Goujian of Yue, who had been biding his time and building up his strength to avenge his past defeat and humiliation by Wu. On the history and culture of the southern “barbarian” state of Yue, see Erica Fox Brindley, Ancient China and the Yue: Perceptions and Identities on the Southern Frontier, c. 400 BCE – 50 CE (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). ↩︎
58. King Fuchai was making a bid for hegemony over the Zhou states and feared losing his ability to negotiate from a position of strength if the other lords knew that he was facing a military crisis back home. ↩︎
59. The state given precedence in a covenant would formally have hegemony over the others. ↩︎
60. By this time, the Wu ruling house claimed descent from Taibo, a senior uncle of King Wen of the Zhou who had purportedly ceded his right to the royal succession by going south and founding his own state. Since the Hua-Xia ruling houses with the Ji clan name were descended from King Wen, the Wu ancestral claim technically gave the Wu ruler seniority over them all. However, the Jin elite was apparently unwilling to recognize the Wu king’s claim to Ji ancestry. ↩︎
61. Zhao Yang intends to fight a battle with the Wu army to decide whose claim to seniority should stand. ↩︎
62. Only members of the elite class could afford to eat meat regularly, resulting in a ruddier complexion; people of lower classes often had a sallower complexion, commonly described as “the vegetable[-eating] complexion.” A “dark ink-like complexion” could be a result of poor diet but could also arise from emotional distress. ↩︎
63. Yin seems to be using Yi in its generic sense as “barbarian” here. ↩︎