After the First Emperor’s death in 210 BCE, the unified Qin empire rapidly collapsed in a wave of rebellions. For nearly seventy years, the subsequent Han dynasty maintained a policy of low taxation, low expenditure, and minimal interference with local society, and avoided war with the newly ascendant Xiongnu empire. These policies were grounded in a belief that the Qin’s high taxes, harsh laws, and military conflict with the Xiongnu (which involved the construction of the first Great Wall) had all contributed to its fall. Instead, a “peace and kinship” or “harmonious kinship” (heqin) policy of marrying Han imperial clanswomen (represented as “princesses”) to Xiongnu rulers and sending them generous gifts served to keep Xiongnu raids on the Han frontiers relatively small in scale.

After 133 BCE, Emperor Wu (r. 141-87 BCE) switched to a policy of full-scale war with the Xiongnu, aimed at breaking their military power and forcing them into submission. By 119 BCE, Han armies had captured the Ordos and Gansu Corridor regions and mounted a successful attack deep into the heart of the steppe. But the war had also bankrupted the Han imperial government, forcing it to raise new revenue by introducing state monopolies on the sale of certain essential goods: salt, iron, and liquor. The monopolies financed further expeditions against the Xiongnu, the Great Wall’s extension into Gansu, and even the conquest of the southern kingdoms of Southern Yue (Nanyue) and Eastern Yue (Dongyue) and the proto-Korean state of Chaoxian (Joseon) in 112-108 BCE. But they also placed a heavy burden on the people to which there seemed no end, as the war with the Xiongnu settled into a stalemate. In 81 BCE, six years after Emperor Wu’s death, the regent Huo Guang (d. 68 BCE) convened a conference at the imperial court to discuss abolishing the monopolies and ending the war.

Huan Kuan’s Yantie lun purports to be a blow-by-blow transcript of the ensuing debate, although most historians now believe it to be a semi-fictionalized account written at least a decade after the event. In Huan’s account, the Imperial Counsellor Sang Hongyang (d. 80 BCE), one of the architects of the monopoly policy, staunchly advocates maintaining the monopolies for the sake of winning the war, while unnamed “scholars” (wenxue) condemn the war policy as ruinous for the people and urge a return to what they believe to have been the ancient sage-kings’ governing philosophy of relying on moral suasion rather than military force. Both sides cite classical texts (including Confucian classics) and historical precedents to support their position, but the scholars often gain the upper hand and leave Sang Hongyang at a loss for words, while the pragmatic Sang’s contempt for the Confucian scholars’ impractical moralism occasionally shades into derision towards Confucius himself. Huan Kuan himself seems to have been sympathetic to the Confucian perspective, but also interested in using his book to provide models for argumentation from both idealist and realist/pragmatist points of view.

Historically, the debate was inconclusive. The liquor monopoly (never practically enforceable) was abolished, and Huo Guang had Sang Hongyang executed a year later on a charge of participating in a treasonous conspiracy. But the salt and iron monopolies remained in place (except for a brief period in 44-41 BCE) for the rest of the Western Han dynasty. The war with the Xiongnu continued, widening into the “Western Regions” of Central Asia (modern Xinjiang), until the Xiongnu empire temporarily broke up in a civil war in 58 BCE and one of the contenders submitted to Han suzerainty in exchange for support against his rivals.

The translation below is mine, but for the excerpt from Chapter 16, I have consulted Esson M. Gale’s translation of chapters 1 to 19 of the text, Discourses on Salt and Iron: A Debate on State Control of Commerce and Industry in Ancient China (Leiden: Brill, 1931).

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From Chapter 16: “Diguang” (Territorial expansion)

The Imperial Counsellor (Sang Hongyang) said, “The true king embraces all and shelters all, loving his subjects impartially. He does not confer additional largesse on those near him, nor does he neglect to extend his favor to those far away. Now we are all equally his subjects and ministers. Yet some live in safety and ease, while others face danger and toil. Shouldn’t that be a reason to change things? Aren’t you being overly contentious, giving thought only to some but not others?

The people on the frontiers live in a land of bitter cold, facing the threat of the powerful Hu (Xiongnu). They are in danger of losing their lives whenever the warning beacons are lit. Therefore, that the Central Lands can sleep in peace, while the people on the frontiers are fighting a hundred battles, is all due to the protective screen provided by the border commanderies. The Odes says, ‘This is all the king’s business, yet I alone am made to toil in it.’¹ This was meant to criticize inequity. Therefore, the sagely emperor, caring for the suffering borne by the four quarters of the empire alone, raised armies to drive back the Hu and Yue, removing them to a distance so that they would no longer afflict the frontier. He distributed the surplus of the fertile fields of the Central Lands to meet the need of the frontier regions. As the frontier regions are strengthened, the Central Lands will in turn enjoy peace. When the Central Lands enjoy peace, then we can live at ease and without worries. What more can you ask for? Why not keep quiet?”

The scholars replied, “In ancient times, the Son of Heaven stood at the center of the subcelestial realm. His own domain covered no more than a thousand li, while territory assigned to the lords did not reach to uncultivable lands. The lands included in the “Yugong” (Tribute of Yu) extended to five thousand li.² The people paid taxes to their respective rulers, and the lords protected their respective states. Hence the people enjoyed equity and harmony and were not burdened by demands for corvée labor and military service.³ Now we have pushed back the Hu and the Yue several thousand li across long and circuitous routes. The troops are worn out. Hence the people on the frontier face the disaster of being beheaded by the enemy, and the Central Lands suffer from death and ruin. That is why the people clamor and will not be quiet.

Now, the way of governing a state lies in proceeding from the center to the periphery, beginning from areas nearby. Only after those near at hand have attached themselves submissively to the government, should measures be taken to invite those far away to submit. Only after the people within are contented, should we care about foreign lands. Hence when the ministers proposed to establish a military colony at Luntai, our enlightened ruler (Emperor Wu) did not give his assent, thinking that his proper duty was to remedy the immediate problems close by. Thus he issued an edict saying: “The priority for the present is to interdict harsh and cruel treatment of the people, to put a stop to arbitrary levies, and to concentrate upon the essential sector of agriculture.”⁴ The ministers ought, therefore, to follow the emperor’s wishes by removing unworthy officials to relieve the people from their suffering. Now the Central Lands are exhausted and in decline, yet they show no anxiety but busily engage themselves in frontier questions. Is it not true that we have vast areas lying uncultivated, much sowing without ploughing, and much labor without fruit? This is what the Odes meant by: ‘Don’t try to cultivate an over-large field/The weeds will only grow luxuriantly.’”⁵

The Imperial Counsellor said, “It was not for love of war that Tang and King Wu took up arms [against the last kings of Xia and Shang].⁶ Nor was it due to lust for conquest that King Xuan of Zhou expanded his territory by a thousand li.⁷ Their purpose was to eliminate raiders and villains and thus bring peace to the people. Therefore, a noble man will not undertake a fruitless military expedition and a sage-king will not covet useless land. The late emperor raised armies in the spirit of Tang and King Wu and quelled threats on three frontiers (southeast, northeast, and southwest). Then he turned in one direction (northward) to subdue the enemy. As the Xiongnu fled, he constructed defenses along the Yellow River and the mountains. Hence he turned away from the barren wastes of sand, rock and infertile soil, and ceded an isolated county in the territory of Zaoyang to the Hu (Xiongnu).⁸ He dispensed with a garrison at the bend of the Great Wall, occupied strategic positions on the Yellow River, and limited himself to guarding the important points in order to lighten corvée and military conscription and preserve the people’s welfare. From this we can see that a sage ruler’s intent is not solely to expand his territory at his people’s expense.”

The scholars replied, “The Qin dynasty certainly went to extremes in waging wars. Meng Tian certainly extended its borders to a great distance.⁹ Yet now, we have gone beyond Meng Tian’s borders and have established commanderies and counties in the land of the raiding caitiffs (i.e., Xiongnu). The further we expand our territory, the greater the burden on the people. To the west of Shuofang commandery and to the north of Chang’an, the outlay for the organization of new commanderies and the expense of building frontier forts are beyond calculation. Not only that: when Sima [Xiangru] and Tang Meng built a road to the southwestern barbarians, the Ba and Shu regions (Sichuan) began to be exhausted for the sake of the regions of Qiong and Zuo.¹⁰ The Sea-Traversing General led expeditions against the southern barbarians; the General of Tower Ships attacked the eastern Yue; and the region of Jing-Chu (Hubei) was then exhausted for the sake of the Ou and Luo.¹¹ After the General of the Left attacked Chaoxian (Joseon) and established Lintun commandery, the regions of Yan (Hebei) and Qi (Shandong) suffered due to the Hui and Mo.¹² Zhang Qian made contact with strange and distant lands, but brought in only useless exotics.¹³ Thus the reserves of the imperial treasury flow to foreign countries, and the vast outflow can hardly be mitigated by saving the cost of an isolated county at Zaoyang. From this we can see that the whole problem is not due to our ruler’s intent. Rather, it is the fault of warmongering officials who only know how to think like county magistrates.”¹⁴

From Chapter 27, “Liyi” (Debating Profit) and Chapter 28, “Guoji” (The Ills of the State”)

The Imperial Counsellor said, “Ha! You scholars are a mediocre and undistinguished bunch who talk a lot but have never been employed in government. Your inner thoughts do not match your outward appearance; like burglars and thieves, you have been a plague since antiquity. Confucius was driven out by the Lord of Lu and was never employed as a minister in his time. Why? Because he was indecisive and pedantic, focused on things that mattered little.¹⁵ Hence the King of Qin burned [the books containing] his teachings and did not adopt them, and executed [Confucian scholars] on the banks of the Wei River rather than employ them.¹⁶ What right have you to wag your tongues and raise your eyebrows like this, coming to the court to speak and dispute over state affairs?”

The scholars said, “When a state has worthy men and does not employ them, it is not the worthy men’s fault; rather, it is the ruler’s own shame. Confucius was a great sage, and though the various lords failed to employ him, he did hold a low position [as minister of laws] in the government of Lu. Within three months, policies were implemented without being promulgated as law, and unlawful practices ceased without being expressly prohibited. It was like a timely rain watering the land; not one thing failed to spring to life. How much more so our dynasty, which rules the entire realm and spreads the moral authority and teaching of our sagely ruler? Now you ministers have sat in high positions and handled the important affairs of the realm for more than ten years, but you have brought no benefit to the realm. Instead, you burden the people so that they are impoverished and destitute, while in your own homes you accumulate fortunes in gold….

In the past, Shang Yang as Chancellor of Qin devalued ritual propriety and prioritized greed. He favored fighting men who took many enemy heads in battle, and devoted himself to military expansion. He lacked moral authority over the people and instead used harsh penalties to control the state. Customs grew ever more corrupt and the people ever more resentful, and so King Hui [of Qin] had Shang Yang boiled and ground into mincemeat to appease the realm.¹⁷ What ability did he then have to speak on state affairs? You ministers of state complain that we Confucians are poor and lowly but talk too much, but we Confucians worry that you ministers, though rich and powerful, will come to a similarly bad end!”

The Imperial Counsellor glared at the scholars sullenly but did not speak.

The Chancellor (Huo Guang) said, “When debating the policies of the state and the successes and failures of ministers, can we not speak softly and rationally? Why these sharp and cutting words? That the Imperial Counsellor opposes abolishing the salt and iron monopolies is not due to self-interest, but because he is concerned about the expenditures of the state and the costs of defending the frontiers. That you scholars earnestly oppose the salt and iron monopolies is also not due to self-interest, but because you wish to return to the ways of antiquity and advise the emperor to rule humanely and justly. Each side has its own principles, but times have changed, so how can we cling stubbornly to the methods of antiquity and reject new ideas? Since you quote the Odes to criticize people, you must have some better alternative to propose. If you have the means to maintain stability within the state, bring foreign countries to submit to the emperor, and rid our frontiers of the plague of enemy raids, then we would abolish all taxes for your sake, let alone the salt and iron monopolies and equitable marketing!¹⁸ Confucian scholars are esteemed for being humble and respectful and for treating all people in accordance with the Way. Now you debate in such blunt fashion, unlike the manner of speech of Confucius’s disciples Gongxi Chi and Duanmu Ci¹⁹, and the look on your faces is rude and insolent. This is something I have never seen! The Imperial Counsellor spoke too harshly, but you scholars are no different! Shouldn’t you apologize to the Imperial Counsellor?”

The scholars rose from their seats [as a gesture of respect] and said, “We are ignorant men of the countryside and have rarely entered the imperial court. We have said much that seems outrageous and inappropriate, and have thus offended you ministers. Medicine is bitter to the mouth but good for curing disease; likewise, loyal counsel is grating to the ears but good for correcting one’s ways. Hence it is good fortune to be reproved bluntly, while flowery talk is the talk of traitors. Strong gusts of wind are more common in the forest, and the rich and powerful are more prone to hear flattery. At the court of a great empire, where one hears ‘yes, yes’ everyday, listening to the blunt words of scholars like us is the best medicine for you ministers!”

From Chapter 38, “Beihu” (Guarding Against the Hu)

The Imperial Counsellor said: ““There is a saying among the common people: ‘The worthy man will not tolerate insult.’ Let us take a mundane analogy: when there is a violent criminal in a village, even the villagers will band together to drive him out. Now, with the enlightened Son of Heaven above us, the Xiongnu openly raid us, harassing and disturbing the frontier. This means that humaneness and morality are violated, while the wicked run rampant. In the past, the Di tribes attacked King Tai²⁰ and the men of Kuang intimidated Confucius.²¹ Thus, the inhumane are the enemies of the humane. Therefore the county magistrates rigorously employ military force to punish the immoral, and set up defensive devices to guard against the inhumane.”

The scholars replied, “The Xiongnu dwell in the deserts, in barren lands that cannot sustain life, despised and cast off by Heaven. They have no houses to dwell in and no distinctions between men and women. They take the open wilderness as their village and felt tents as their houses. They clothe themselves in hides and furs, eating meat and drinking blood. They gather for trade and then disperse again to their herds and camps, just like the elaphures of the Central Lands.²² Warmongering ministers seek to hold them to standards of moral duty and ritual propriety, and as a result the wars waged by the Central Lands have yet to cease, with defenses set up across ten thousand li. This is what the ode “Tuzhi” (Rabbit Nets) satirizes: morally inferior men are not trustworthy shields and walls for their lords.”²³

The Imperial Counsellor said, “The Son of Heaven is the father and mother of the whole subcelestial realm. There is not one person in the world’s four quarters who does not wish to be his subject, yet he still maintains city walls, establishes fortified passes, trains his soldiers, and has guards in his palace. Thus does he eliminate all threats from afar and guard against dangers from every corner. Now the Xiongnu have not submitted to us, and even if we were not waging war on them, how could we simply abolish our defenses and let down our guard?”

The scholars replied, “The King of Wu was captured by Yue because he crossed over lands close by to attack those far away.²⁴ The Qin empire fell because it guarded against the Hu and Yue outside while neglecting governance within. Using armies beyond the frontier leads to political collapse within; the guarding itself becomes the threat and the source of increased worry for the ruler. That is why, when a ruler follows the Way [of rulership], then all near and far come and submit to him: such was King Wen [of Zhou]. If he does not follow the Way, then even his subjects will become rebels and bandits: such was the king of Qin. Hence, when civility wanes then martiality waxes, and when moral authority is at its height then the needs for defense are few.”

The Imperial Counsellor said, “In the past, the barbarians of the four quarters were all strong and violently raided our frontiers. Chaoxian (Joseon) crossed the border and pillaged the eastern territories of Yan. Eastern Yue (Min Yue) crossed the eastern sea and plundered the lands south of the Zhe (Qiantang) River. Southern Yue (Nan Yue) invaded us and caused chaos in Fuling.²⁵ The Di, Bo, Ranmang, Suitang, and Kunming peoples brought disorder to Longxi, Ba, and Shu commanderies.²⁶ Now three frontiers have been pacified, and only the northern border remains unsettled. With just one campaign we could strike terror into the Xiongnu, and all defenses both internal and external could then be abolished. Would that not be even better than few?”

The scholars replied, “In antiquity, noble men established their humaneness and cultivated their morality to bring peace to the people. Thus those close by became good and those far away submitted. That is how, when Confucius served as a minister in Lu, in the first three months relations with Qi became peaceful, and in the next three months relations with Zheng became peaceful. He used moral authority to bring peace to those both near and far. At that time, Lu had no danger from enemy states on its borders, and its powerful ministers changed their ways and became loyal: thus Ji Huanzi tore down the walls of his own city.²⁷ Larger states, in awe of [Confucius’s] morality, made peace with Lu: the men of Qi came and returned the fields of Yun, Huan, and Guiyin [that Qi had previously seized from Lu]. Thus when one governs through moral authority, not only can one eliminate threats and defeat enemies; one can even gain what one desires without even asking for it. Now the common people are clamoring with resentment, and there is no peace both within the empire and without, and this is all because of our war with the Xiongnu. The Xiongnu have no homes to guard and no fields of crops to harvest. They drive their herds around in search of good grass and water. They have not changed their way of life, while we in the Central Lands are already in a state of tumult. They gather like the winds and disperse like the clouds, fleeing the moment we encounter them and scattering the moment we attack them. It is impossible to defeat them with just one campaign.”

The Imperial Counsellor said, “In antiquity, enlightened rulers punished violent bullies and defended the weak. They stabilized states that were tottering on the brink of collapse and rescued those in crisis. When they defended the weak and rescued those in crisis, then the lords of small states were delighted; when they punished violent bullies and stabilized collapsing states, then the innocent people submitted. Now, if we do not launch punitive expeditions, then the harm done by violent bullies will not cease. If we do not maintain defenses, then that is tantamount to handing our common people over to the enemy. The Annals demotes lords who arrive late for guard duty and states that a noble was killed for failing to report for his tour of guard duty.²⁸ From this we can see that military service and frontier defenses have existed since ancient times and are not unique to the present time.”

The scholars replied, “The lands of the Xiongnu are vast and their cavalry horses are swift and mobile. When victorious, they are like rampaging tigers; when defeated, they are like birds in flight. They avoid our fresh vanguard troops and then rout them when they are exhausted. If we mobilize fewer troops, then they are not adequate for replacing those leaving the front; if we mobilize more troops, then the people cannot bear the conscription. When there is much conscription, then the people’s strength is exhausted; when we spend more on war, then our wealth runs out. As long as both [conscription and spending on war] do not end, the people will continue to be resentful. This is how the Qin empire lost the people’s hearts and collapsed. In antiquity, the Son of Heaven’s domain covered only a thousand li, and his subjects only performed corvée within five hundred li of their homes. News of a military victory could be heard at home within the day, and when a soldier was ill, then his kin could go to the front to tend to him. There was no military campaign or corvée assignment that exceeded its season. The ruler regulated his policies based on the people’s sentiments and tailored them to the limits of their strength. Thus, those mobilized for duty were motivated to do their utmost, while those who stayed behind could go on with their livelihoods in peace. Now, the cavalry horses and armored troops of the Shandong region²⁹ are deployed to remote and distant frontier commanderies. In the lands of the Hu and Yue, they yearn for their aged mothers. Their aged mothers weep and their wives are filled with sorrow and resentment, as they think about their sons and husbands suffering from hunger, thirst, cold, and hardship. Thus says the Odes³⁰:

Back then, when we set out,

The willows were fresh and green.

Now, when we return,

The snow falls in thick clouds.

Long and tedious is our march,

We hunger and we thirst.

Our hearts are stricken with sorrow

And no one knows our grief.

Hence our sage ruler³¹, pitying their state of long separation from parents, wives, and children, and their living exposed in the wilderness in a bitterly cold land, every spring would send emissaries to comfort and reward the troops and provide support for those households that had lost their means of livelihood. Thus did he express compassion for his subjects on the distant frontier and console their aged mothers. His moral authority and beneficence were great indeed, but the officials did not fulfill their duty of carrying the imperial edict to show concern and compassion for the people. Instead, some abused the troops and used them to engage in trade, forcing them to perform double duty in an unreasonable manner. Thus the soldiers lose their means of livelihood and their aged mothers, wives, and children harbor resentment…. The Annals records every case of lords mobilizing the masses, because it values the people’s lives. It records that the people of Song besieged Changge so as to deride them for engaging in a long campaign.³² A noble man’s sentiments are always like this.”

The Imperial Counsellor fell silent and did not respond.

From Chapter 52, “Lungong” (On Military Victories)

The Imperial Counsellor said, “The Xiongnu have no walled cities and moats. They do not make sharp halberds and strong crossbows or gather up food reserves in storehouses. Among them, rulers have no morality or laws, and subjects have no civility or rites. Rulers and ministers are discourteous to one another, with no semblance of hierarchy or ritual propriety. They weave willows into houses and use felt rugs as roofs. They have unadorned bows and arrowheads made of bone; their horses are not fed with grains [but with grass]. Their military equipment is nothing to be feared; their rites are unworthy of commendation. As for the Central Lands, they are the stomach and heart of the world, a place where worthy men converge, where ritual propriety and moral duty are concentrated, and where wealth is produced. When the intelligent devise strategies against the stupid and the moral attack the immoral, it is like shaking leaves off a tree during the frosty autumn. The Annals says, ‘Lord Huan [of Qi] dealt with the Rong and Di simply by chasing them away.’³³ How much more so when we use the strength of the entire realm [against the Xiongnu]?”

The scholars said, “The carriages and implements of the Xiongnu are not decorated with silver, gold, silk, and lacquer. They are unadorned and made for sturdiness alone. Their silken clothes are not made with patterns, colors, and fashionable cuts. They are made with a single piece of cloth, with the sole aim of being complete. Their men do not busy themselves with ornate artisanship or building palaces and walled cities. Their women do not weave excessively embroidered fine silk textiles as a tax to the ruler. Their activities are labor-saving and practical; their products are easily made and durable. They may not have sharp halberds and strong crossbows, war horses and fine bows, but each family has its own equipment and every man has his own gear. As soon as there is a military emergency, each man simply straps on his bow and mounts his horse. Their food supplies, when piled up, would cover the top of a table and sustain them for several tens of days. They use mountains and valleys as their walled cities and rivers and grasslands as their storehouses. Their laws are simple and easily understood; their needs are few and easily met. Thus their penalties are light, yet crimes are few; their ruler’s commands are always obeyed. They may lack courtesy and ritual propriety, but they are true to their word; they may lack civility but are skilled in practical matters. Therefore, although they have no books about ritual propriety and moral duty, they make notches in bones and wood and their officials are thus able to keep records, while rulers are able to deliver commands to their ministers. The ministers who care only for the interests of the court all say that they are easy [to defeat], when in fact they are difficult [to defeat].³⁴ That is why the Qin sought to drive them out but instead destroyed itself. Therefore, weapons of war are ill-omened things and should not be used lightly.³⁵ [One who relies on them could] change from strong to weak and be destroyed within a mere day.”

The Imperial Counsellor said, “Lu Zhonglian said, ‘Qin controls its officers through coercive power and uses its people like slaves.’³⁶ That is why its governance was over-hasty and short-lived. Emperor Gao received the Mandate of Heaven and brought an end to violence and chaos.³⁷ His achievements were magnificent, equaled only by Heaven itself. Emperors Wen (r. 180-157 BCE) and Jing (r. 157-141 BCE) inherited his legacy and polished it with their own accomplishments. Then the former emperor (Emperor Wu) attacked the immoral and repelled those without moral authority, thus illuminating the path of the humane sage and purifying the foundations of his supreme moral authority. This was the accumulated result of years of rule by sage-kings. Now you scholars are citing the misgovernment of a fallen dynasty (the Qin) and comparing it to the present. Of course, you would say that the Xiongnu are hard to defeat!”

The scholars said, “In the time of Shun, the Three Miao refused to submit. Yu wanted to attack them, but Shun said, ‘This is because my moral authority is still unknown to them.’ He returned to cultivating good governance, and the Three Miao then submitted.³⁸ The sage-kings did not wage war or expend effort on lands that cannot be shepherded and peoples that cannot be bridled, considering these to be unworthy of burdening the people and exhausting the Central Lands. Now our enlightened ruler is cultivating the legacy of his sagely predecessors and spreading his transformative moral authority, yet at his court there are schemes based on coercive power and a preference for rewarding the taking of heads in battle.³⁹ We find this strange indeed. When ministers expend the might of the entire realm and the wealth of the entire empire to benefit themselves, with no thought for their ruler’s interests, that is how Magistrate Tuo (Zhao Tuo) and Zhang Han became kings while the Qin lost its empire. Sunzi said, ‘A state may go through a hundred political crises a day, but if it does not fall, then it can learn lessons and reform itself. But once it sends its army out to fight on the wide open plains, with drums beating and arrows flying, then even one as wise as Yao or Shun cannot change its fate.’⁴⁰ If one achieves victory in war and then withdraws his troops to cultivate ritual propriety and moral duty, following the path of the three dynasties (Xia, Shang, and Zhou), then one will acquire a reputation for humaneness and morality. But if one achieves victory and does not stop fighting, then he will lose his life and his state: such was the case of the King of Wu.”⁴¹

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1. This line is actually not in the Odes itself but in Mencius 5A.4, where Mencius (see source 1.4) offers it as the proper context for these lines in the ode “Beishan” (Northern Hill): “The entire subcelestial realm is the king’s land/All within the four seas are the king’s subjects.” ↩︎
2. That is, 2,500 li on either side of the capital. See source 2.2. ↩︎
3. Under the Western Han system, every able-bodied male between the ages of 23 and 56 was required to render two full years of service in the army and one month of service as unpaid labor (corvée) per year. ↩︎
4. This refers to Emperor Wu’s famous Luntai Edict of 89 BCE, in which he rejected Sang Hongyang’s proposal to establish a military colony at Luntai (modern Luntai county, Xinjiang) and announced a halt to the war with the Xiongnu due to the burdens it was placing on the people. A full translation can be found here. ↩︎
5. This quotes the ode “Futian” (Over-large Field). ↩︎
6. According to legend, Tang was the sage-king who overthrew the last king of Xia and founded the Shang dynasty. Centuries later, the cycle repeated when King Wu of Zhou overthrew the Shang. ↩︎
7. King Xuan briefly revived his dynasty’s fortunes by launching expeditions against the Xianyun, the Rong, the Yi of the Huai River, and the state of Chu (Jing) in 823-822 BCE. Passages from odes depicting these campaigns are translated in source 1.1. ↩︎
8. The Zaoyang area corresponds to modern Zhangjiakou, Hebei. According to the Shiji, the Han strategically abandoned this county to the Xiongnu in 127 BCE, shortly after capturing the Ordos region. ↩︎
9. Meng Tian was the Qin general responsible for the military expedition that drove the Xiongnu out of the Ordos in 214-213 BCE. ↩︎
10. Around 135 BCE, the Han official Tang Meng and the court poet Sima Xiangru persuaded Emperor Wu to build a road extending from the Sichuan Basin through the regions of Qiong and Zuo (modern Guizhou), so as to gain control over the kingdom of Yelang. The project was aborted after several years due to the high costs incurred, including the deaths of many workers from hunger and disease. ↩︎
11. Luo was a label applied to the native inhabitants of Jiaozhi (the Red River delta in north Vietnam). Ou and Yue were labels applied generically to peoples living along the southern coast. The Sea-Traversing General, Han Yue, and the General of Tower Ships, Yang Pu, commanded Han troops in the conquest of the southern kingdoms of Southern Yue and Eastern Yue in 112-111 BCE. ↩︎
12. The Hui and Mo (Ye and Maek in Korean) were peoples associated with the northern part of the Korean peninsula and adjacent areas of northeast China (Manchuria). The General of the Left, Xun Zhi, commanded Han troops in the conquest of the north Korean kingdom of Chaoxian (Joseon) in 109-108 BCE. Lintun was the easternmost of four commanderies established in north Korea after the conquest. ↩︎
13. In 138-125 BCE, the Han official Zhang Qian went on a diplomatic mission to make contact with the Yuezhi people of Bactria and propose an alliance against the Xiongnu. The mission failed to achieve an alliance, but enabled Zhang Qian to bring extensive knowledge of Central Asia back to the Han court. Subsequently, Zhang served as an envoy to the Wusun people of Ferghana and laid the foundations for a Han-Wusun alliance against the Xiongnu. He and later envoys were credited with introducing the cultivation of grapes and alfalfa to the Chinese. ↩︎
14. That is, they concern themselves only with collecting revenue rather than bigger questions of policy and principle. ↩︎
15. According to extant biographies of Confucius, he actually resigned his ministerial post and left the state of Lu because he had made powerful enemies and had become disappointed with the Lord of Lu’s lack of interest in governing well. ↩︎
16. This alludes to the famous but possibly mythical story of the First Emperor of Qin burning all Confucian texts and carrying out mass executions of Confucian scholars. ↩︎
17. According to the standard biography of Shang Yang, he was killed in battle after rebelling against King Hui, who then had his corpse dismembered. ↩︎
18. Equitable marketing was a revenue-generating policy involving buying goods when prices were low and selling when high, managed by government warehouses to control market fluctuations and secure essential resources for the state. ↩︎
19. Gongxi Chi (also known as Zihua) and Duanmu Ci (also known as Zigong) were disciples of Confucius known for their eloquence and skill as diplomats. ↩︎
20. Under King Tai, the Zhou people had settled in the Bin region but were repeatedly attacked by hostile Rong and Di peoples. After four attempts to buy off the aggressors with goods failed, King Tai decided against fighting them and relocated his people to Mount Qi. ↩︎
21. Confucius and his disciples were once ambushed and surrounded by the men of Kuang while traveling through the state of Kuang. The men of Kuang mistook Confucius for Yang Hu, a powerful and ruthless official from the state of Lu, who had terrorized the region. Because Confucius resembled Yang Hu, the men of Kuang sought revenge. ↩︎
22. This metaphor dehumanizes the Xiongnu by likening them to deer roaming around in large herds. ↩︎
23. The ode uses the metaphor of net traps set for rabbits to praise loyal warriors serving their lord. Here, the scholars interpret it not as an ode of praise but a satirical ode. ↩︎
24. This refers to King Fuchai of Wu being invaded by King Goujian of Yue while seeking hegemony in the north (see source 1.2). ↩︎
25. A location south of Changsha, Hunan. ↩︎
26. These were peoples of the Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan frontiers. ↩︎
27. This refers to an incident in 498 BCE when Confucius (as a minister in Lu) launched an initiative to demolish the walls of three cities that served as power bases for ministerial families that defied the authority of the Lord of Lu and the Three Huan aristocracy. Ji Huanzi, one of the Three Huan leaders, initially supported Confucius, but later turned on him and forced him into exile. ↩︎
28. This refers to passages in the Annals that the Gongyang commentary (see source 1.5) interprets as criticizing lords for not arriving with their armies to defend an endangered state at the stipulated time, as well as a passage that the commentary interprets as stating that the Lord of Lu executed Gongzi Mai (one of his nobles) for refusing to report for guard duty in the state of Wei. The Zuozhuan (see source 1.2) narrative clarifies, however, that the Lord of Lu ordered Gongzi Mai’s execution to appease the state of Jin, which was then attacking Wei. He then avoided antagonizing the state of Chu, which was defending Wei, by claiming that Gongzi Mai’s offense was attempting to leave Wei before his tour of guard duty was over. ↩︎
29. Here, Shandong refers to the North China Plain, east of the Taihang Mountains, and not to the modern province of Shandong. ↩︎
30. This is the last stanza of the ode “Caiwei” (Gathering Ferns), a lament by Western Zhou soldiers on campaign against the Xianyun (see source 1.1). ↩︎
31. Meaning Emperor Wu ↩︎
32. This siege took place in 718-717 BCE during a war between Song and Zheng. Both the Guliang and Gongyang commentaries (see source 1.5) note that the Annals typically does not record sieges or the capture of cities, and argue that it makes an exception in this case to criticize the length of the siege, which lasted from one year to the next. ↩︎
33. This quotes the Gongyang commentary to the Annals (see source 1.5) for Lord Zhuang, Year 30 (664 BCE). On the sentence, “A man of Qi attacked the Mountain Rong,” the commentator first explains that Lord Huan of Qi was demoted to “a man” for over-aggressiveness, then explains that the attack was not described a battle because the Annals only regards military clashes between evenly-matched sides as battles: “Lord Huan dealt with the Rong and Di simply by chasing them away.” ↩︎
34. The scholars’ effort at painting a positive picture of Xiongnu society has echoes of Sima Qian (see source 1.8), but should be understood as a purely rhetorical exercise, aimed at rebutting Sang Hongyang’s claim that the Xiongnu empire is weak and easily defeated. ↩︎
35. This anti-war saying is found in several early Chinese texts of varying intellectual persuasions. ↩︎
36. Lu Zhonglian was a traveling “persuader” who, in 259-257 BCE, used his rhetorical skills to foil an attempt by the state of Qin to force the state of Zhao to recognize the king of Qin as an emperor (di). The quote here comes from Lu Zhonglian’s Shiji biography and from the similar account in the Zhanguo ce (Strategies of the Warring States). ↩︎
37. Emperor Gao was a posthumous title for Liu Bang, who founded the Han dynasty after the fall of Qin and reigned as emperor from 202 BCE to his death in 195 BCE. ↩︎
38. This story is found in several early Chinese texts, the earliest being from the late third century BCE. In some versions, Shun cultivates good governance for three years and then wins the Three Miao (see source 1.7) over by performing a war dance with shield and axe in hand. ↩︎
39. This again quotes Lu Zhonglian’s description of Qin as an inhumane and militaristic state. ↩︎
40. This passage is not in the received text of the Art of War attributed to Sunzi. ↩︎
41. That is, King Fuchai of Wu. ↩︎